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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Health situation in Ukraine is not encouraging. According to the estimation of the World Health 
Organization healthy life expectancy at birth in Ukraine remains low comparing to other European 
countries. The real problem is faced by Ukraine in the form of tuberculosis epidemics. The poor 
health of Ukrainians might be attributed to several factors, among which are deficiencies of health 
care system. Basically, the Ukrainian health care sector was rather intact since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, while neighboring countries were conducting various health care reforms. While ac-
cording to the Constitution the health care is declared to be free of charge, the private payments 
both formal and informal are common in Ukraine. Insufficient government financing created the 
situation that promoted segregation of population by the level of income, place of residence, and, 
thus, contradicts to the constitutional guarantee of free health care provision to all. As a result, the 
current health care system is delivers poor results and lacks equity. Taking into account social and 
economic transition of the last decade, Ukrainian health care sector needs reforms and implementa-
tion of new type of relations both on the national and local levels.  
Recent years have been marked by heated discussions related to the introduction of the compulsory 
state health insurance. However, numerous draft laws failed to be approved by the Parliament. The 
weakest point of those draft laws was treating this type of insurance as a mechanism of pouring 
more money into the current system. At the same time, as our Institutional analysis indicate, there 
are many structural deficiencies in the system, including improper funds allocation, lack of incen-
tives, low managerial autonomy and absence of competition between providers. Therefore, in con-
formity with evidence from other countries it is imperative to correct these deficiencies along with 
the introduction of a more efficient funding allocation mechanism. 
Our research has indicated that performance and quality should be the major subjects for health care 
reforms in Ukraine. While elaborating policy recommendations the restrictions on reforms should 
be taken into account. The major restriction in Ukraine is an existence of equilibrium in the sector, 
which is created and supported by informal payments.  
The reforms should ensure better finance allocation, improved incentives, more efficient manage-
ment, introduction of market elements, definition of role of key stakeholders, including government, 
health care providers (HCP), and patients. The policies should be aimed at creating regulated mar-
ket of health care provision, which is characterized by competition and will meet the needs of the 
population. After deficiencies of the health care system are corrected and efficiency increased the 
government can consider the possibility to introduce compulsory health insurance, which will be 
provided by both public and private health insurance companies. 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Health is one of the major values of the people's life. For the country it is important as stimulates 
human capital accumulation and development. In Ukraine the health care system produces rather 
poor outcomes contributing to low life expectancy, high rates of sickness and tuberculoses epi-
demic. One of the causes of such situation is improper structure of health sector and inadequate and 
insufficient financing. The worsening of people health and demographic situation create a pressure 
for systematic changes in the health sector.  
Ukraine inherited rather complex structure of the health sector from the Soviet Union, which was 
intact during years of Ukrainian independence, while neighboring countries were conducting health 
reforms. The health care is declared to be free of charge, but private payments both formal and in-
formal are common in Ukraine. Such situation has endorsed segregation of population by the in-
come level, place of residence, contradicting to the universal constitutional guarantee of free health 
care provision. At the same time, the possibility of making informal payments creates equilibrium 
in the system, though the outcome is not an efficient one.  
Taking into account social and economic transition of last decade, Ukrainian health sector needs 
reforms. While it is widely accepted that budget financing is insufficient, not all politicians pay at-
tention to the necessity to correct failures and structural problems of the system. The content of re-
forms remains unclear at the moment. 
The objective of our research is to provide health-care decision makers with high-quality evidence 
to enable them to make informed choices about the measures they should undertake in order to im-
prove equity and quality of health care sector in Ukraine. For this, we describe the health sector, 
revealing its weaknesses and failures. In order to obtain clear vision on how the sector operates we 
use focus groups and interviews. Besides, we study international experience on health care policies 
concentrating on competition enhancement and motivation of health personnel. The tools we use 
help us to reveal failures and deficiencies of the health care system in Ukraine. Even partial correc-
tion of the revealed failures will increase the equity of the health care sector. Following Whitehead 
(2000), we would like to stress that the aim of policy for equity and health is not to eliminate all 
health differences so that everyone has the same health level and quality, but rather to reduce or 
eliminate those that result from factors that are considered to be both avoidable and unfair.1 Find-
ings of our research are used for elaboration of policy recommendations aimed at improving quality 
and equity of the health care system.  
The report is structured as follows. First, we describe health situation in Ukraine and provide de-
scription of methodological tools used in the research. In the next section, we analyze data and 
                                                 
1 The equity in health care might be defined as equal access to available care for equal need, equal utilization for equal 
need, equal quality of care for all. 
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Ukrainian legislation and indicate the major characteristics and drawbacks of current health care 
system. Using the results of the qualitative part of the research we describe the real working of 
health care system. In the next chapter we present the political agenda of Ukraine and point of view 
of policy-makers on health reforms. In the last sections we summarize the major findings and pro-
vide policy recommendations.  
2. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY USED 
2.1. Health situation in Ukraine  
Health situation in Ukraine is not encouraging. According to the estimation of the World Health Or-
ganization healthy life expectancy at birth in Ukraine remains rather low comparing to the members 
of the European Union at 62 years for man, and 73 for woman (see Appendix A1). Life expectancy at 
birth varies between regions of Ukraine (66.27 years in Odessa region and 71.35 in Kyiv City). 
The poor health of Ukrainians might be attributed to several factors, including poverty, ecological 
environment, and deficiencies of health care system. Mass poverty (around 30% of households) 
contributed to the spread of the HIV/AIDS. The real problem is faced by Ukraine in the form of tu-
berculosis epidemics. Over the last decade the number of people with this illness substantially in-
creased from 41.8 persons per 100 thous. of population in 1995 to 84.4 persons in 2005. One of the 
explanations of such trend might be a lack of efficient preventive health care measures. 
The main causes of death are diseases of the circulatory system followed by injury, and respiratory 
diseases. The tobacco and alcohol consumption is rather high in Ukraine, also contributing to low 
life expectancy. Maternal mortality, though falling, remains about five times the EU average. Be-
sides, Ukrainians have health problems due to Chornobyl nuclear accident. For instance, cancer in-
cidence is more than three times higher than EU average. 
While data reveals that health situation in Ukraine is not encouraging, the access to the health care 
services is poor. In 2005 around 13% of households reported that they were not able to receive nec-
essary health care services, when needed.2 From these households around 77% claimed that the rea-
son for that were high costs of needed consultation of a doctor, 95% could not buy necessary medi-
cal devices, as they also were too expensive. Besides, there are significant regional differences in 
the access to the health care services. In order to improve the situation the government should con-
duct policies aimed at enhancing quality and equity of the health care system.  
2.2. Objective  
The objective of our research is to provide health-care decision makers with high-quality evidence 
to enable them to make informed choices about the measures they should undertake in order to im-
prove equity and quality of health care sector in Ukraine. 
                                                 
2 The State Statistical Office of Ukraine (2005). 
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2.3. Methodological tools  
In order to reach the objective of our research we use several methodological tools (for data 
sources see Table 1). First, we start our research from analyzing available data on health situation 
in Ukraine. Such analysis shows weak outcomes of the health care system in Ukraine as well as 
points out at some failures of the system. Then the institutional analysis intends to reveal weak-
nesses of the health care system and provides us with the basis for policy recommendation on im-
proving the structure of the health care system. For this we study Ukrainian legislation, rules of 
the game, etc. 
Table 1. Data sources used in the research 
Methodological tools: Data sources 
Analyzing available data the The State Statistical Office of Ukraine  
the Ministry of Health 
the WHO 
Institutional analysis the Constitution of Ukraine  
the laws, resolution, orders of Ukrainian authorities 
Study international experience the papers on health economics 
reports of international organizations 
Qualitative analysis 4 focus groups (3 with patients (age groups: 19–22, 25–35, 36–55) and 1 with 
doctors); 
in-depth interviews (10 with heads of health care establishments and 10 with 
patients); 
45 standardized interviews with health personnel; 
9 standardized interviews with representatives of political elite. 
We also study international experience on the health care policy. The experience of other countries 
may be valuable for correcting deficiencies of the Ukrainian health care system. 
However, studying data and legislation cannot serve for elaborating compelling case for reforms as 
they miss some important points of cooperation of individuals with health personnel and the real 
extent of some problems. Therefore, we also conduct qualitative analysis that comprises of case 
studies and focus groups discussions and provides us with illustration of inefficiencies existing in 
the health care system and insights into the mechanisms of relationships and activity within the sec-
tor, what gives us more solid basis for elaborating policy recommendations. 
Qualitative research has become an invaluable research tool for the rapid collection of information 
by means of respondents' attitudes towards different issues of social reality and policy studies 
(Luntz, 1994). This tool was used in order to obtain information on rules of the game worked out by 
key stakeholders as well as reveal their perception of current problems. 
The following qualitative methods have been applied: focus groups, in depth one-to-one interviews, 
standardized interviews with open-end questions (see Appendix A2). They have targeted three main 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
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groups of audience: providers of health care (health personnel); consumers of heath care (patients); 
policy-makers (members of Parliament, representatives of executive bodies). 
3. HEALTH CARE SECTOR IN UKRAINE:  
INDICATORS, REGULATIONS AND ACTUAL PICTURE 
3.1. Current regulation of health care provision in Ukraine 
The Constitution of Ukraine states health care as being free of charge and being ensured through 
state funding of the relevant socio-economic, medical and sanitary, health improvement and pro-
phylactic programs. At the current level of health care expenditure, the government fails in provid-
ing adequate level of the health care, what makes 'free' health care be just a declared provision. Ac-
cording to the respective decision of the Constitutional Court, people cannot be forced to pay for 
health care provision and, thus, user charges were recognized as non-constitutional. Therefore, in 
case of introduction of the compulsory health insurance, the burden of contribution payments will 
be put on shoulders of employers. This might increase the share of shadow wage payments, as pay-
roll taxes in Ukraine are already excessively high amounting to 38.16%–53.1% of the wage bill. At 
the same time, the Constitutional Court stipulated that health establishments could charge for some 
services, which 'go beyond the limit of health care'. The latter ruling has created hot debates in 
Ukraine directed at the definition of what should be the limit.  
Besides, the Constitution contains a provision, according to which the number of state and munici-
pal health care establishments cannot be reduced. This restricts the possibility of the government to 
use commercialization mechanisms in order to improve the situation in the health care system. 
Therefore, private sector is developing through creation of new private health establishments. 
The only Law that provides basis for health policy was approved in 1992 and is named 'Principles 
of Legislation on Health Care in Ukraine'. It stipulates that national policy is defined by the Par-
liament and involves establishing policy goals, setting standards, allocating budgets and creating 
national health care programs. However, not all provisions of the law are fulfilled in real life. For 
instance, according to the law the national policy is complemented by regional policies reflecting 
specific health care needs of their population. However, in real life the standards are determined 
by the Ministry of Health, and usually do not really allow for taking into account the difference in 
health situation in different regions. The national and regional administrations own and finance 
the health care. The health care system is to be financed at the expense of central and local budg-
ets. According to amendments to the Law made in 1998 health establishments can receive chari-
table donations for improving quality of services provided. While the Law foresees the possibility 
of developing health insurance, it does not foresee respective source of revenues of health estab-
lishments. It is also stated that each individual has a right to choose a doctor, while in practice a 
person should apply to the resident doctor or hospital in order to be served free of charge. There-
fore, though the Law stipulates sound principles for regulating health care sector, its provisions 
are not always fulfilled in real life.  
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
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The Law also foresees the possibility of provision medicine subsidies. The respective legislation 
was developed. It defines certain groups of population that have a right to purchase medicine on 
prescription at discounted or zero prices in case of outpatient treatment. Groups of population eligi-
ble for receiving medicine at zero prices include: 
1. war veterans, etc.; 
2. people having recognized outstanding merits for the fatherland; 
3. persons affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe; 
4. certain pensioners receiving low pensions; 
5. children up to 3 years old; 
6. disabled children up to 16 years old. 
Groups eligible for receiving medicine at prices discounted by 50% include disabled people of 
group 1 and 2 (who are disabled due to occupational or general sickness) and disabled from birth 
people, etc. 
As in a situation with many other privileges and subsidies in Ukraine, medicine subsidies are pro-
vided not to poor people but to different categories of persons. Due to such principle, upper income 
households receive subsidized medicine more often than poor households, what is supported by the 
data from Household budget survey, conducted by the The State Statistical Office of Ukraine. 
According to the Ukrainian legislation, the Ministry of Health is responsible for 1) setting standards 
of health care provisions; 2) defining rules for accreditation of public and private health establish-
ments; 3) licensing health professionals and pharmaceutical producers and distributors; 4) determin-
ing the list of pharmaceuticals, which are allowed for being purchased by public health establish-
ments. However, by now the clear standards of quality health services were not approved yet, what 
makes impossible to monitor the efficiency of work of health establishments. 
In 2000 the President approved the "Concept of Health care development in Ukraine", which fore-
sees the necessity to take into account the population needs while setting standards in the health 
care sector. In 2002 the first National Health Strategy was approved in the government program 
"Health of the Nation" for the period of 2002–2011. The program was developed according to the 
European WHO policy. However, by now no real reforms were accomplished.  
3.2. Current situation of health care provision in Ukraine 
In contradiction to experience of developed countries, in Ukraine the major part of care is provided 
not at a primary level, but on the most expensive level of health care provision — inpatient and spe-
cialized. Therefore, public-owned hospitals continue to be major health care providers (HCP). The 
structure of health care services provided in Ukraine does not correspond to the WHO standards 
(Fig. 1). Some illustration of such inverted pyramid is provided in the Appendix A1.3 In comparison 
                                                 
3 The Minister of Health communicated this message during the Collegium's meeting, held on the 26th of April, 2005. 
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to the EU countries, the number of hospitals per 100000 of population as well as number of in-
patient care admissions is relatively higher in Ukraine. However, their amounts vary significantly 
across regions indicating imbalances in access to the health care services. At the same time, the ra-
tio of primary health care units and number of general practitioners in Ukraine is lower than Euro-
pean average. In Ukraine people often refer to general practitioners only with the aim to receive 
sickness leave documents to be provided to employer. Thus, the role of the primary care is rather 
restricted and preventive care is not treated as an essential part of the health care system. 
 
WHO 
standards 
UKRAINE 
Hospitals
Family doctors 
Polyclinics
 
Fig. 1. Structure of health care provision 
The number of hospitals, beds and staff personnel is defined by the Order of the Ministry of Finance, 
depending on the size of population in the region. The funds are allocated mostly to support the exist-
ing health care facilities, but not to finance needs for health care in the region. We should note that 
during years of independence, the number of hospitals, hospital beds and health personnel was de-
creasing. But, it was rather done by administrative closures due to lack of financing resources, and, 
thus, was not always at the benefit for the public. Such policy contributed to the imbalances in the ac-
cess to the health care services in different regions, in particular, in rural areas. 
Regardless centralized regulation of health care sector in Ukraine, there are regional disparities in the 
indicators. In particular, the number of physicians and middle health personnel varies between the re-
gions (see Fig. 2) indicating the different level of access to the health care services in different regions.  
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Fig. 2. Number of physicians and middle health personnel per 10 thous. persons by regions in 2005. 
Source: The State Statistical Office of Ukraine 
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Sources of financing  
The most health care institutions are publicly owned, and financed from central and local fiscal ex-
penditures (68% of total financing). While over the years public health care spending increased in 
nominal and real terms (Table 2), per capita spending remains rather low by international compari-
son (see Appendix A3).  
Table 2. Real annual health care expenditures (HCE) and their share in GDP in 2002–2006, Index 2002 = 100 
CB HCE SB HCE LB HCE 
 Total  
HCE-Index % GDP 
Per capita 
HCE-Index 
Total  
HCE-Index % GDP 
Total  
HCE-Index % GDP 
2002 100 3.34 100 100 0.7 100 2.64 
2003 121 3.63 122 140 0.88 116 2.75 
2004 133 3.41 135 188 1.01 118 2.4 
2005 149 3.15 152 154 0.77 126 2.38 
2006* 160 3.71 165 168 0.82 162 2.96 
Note: CB — Consolidated fiscal expenditures, SB — Central fiscal expenditures, LB — Local fiscal expenditures, HCE — health 
care expenditures.  
* —estimate. 
Source: State Treasure Reports for 2000–2005, The State Statistical Office of Ukraine, own calculations. 
Due to low spending many hospitals are not well equipped, and most are poorly supplied with diag-
nostic materials, drugs. As a result, patients are increasingly forced to pay privately in order to cir-
cumvent inadequacy in and unresponsiveness of the health system. The private spending account 
for around 32% of total health spending, half of which is attributed to purchase of pharmaceuticals, 
while the rest are informal payments.  
Health Care Spending 
Spending by economic categories: Significant increases in health care spending were mostly at-
tributed to the administrative wage increases, which resulted in increased share of wages in the 
health care expenditures. In 2005 more than 60% of public health care funds were devoted to wage 
payments (see Table 3). According to the information of the Verkhovna Rada in 2006 share of 
wages reached almost 70–75% of total health care spending, while most countries devote a bit over 
42% of total general government health expenditures to paying its health workforce and a bit over 
50% of total health expenditures.4 In Ukraine the wage level in the sector remains one of the lowest 
in economy and wages are usually not connected to the quality, quantity and type of services pro-
vided. Low wages coupled with poor control contribute to prevalence of informal payments in the 
sector.  
                                                 
4 World Health Report for 2006. 
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Table 3. Structure of the consolidated health care spending according to economic budget classification in 2000–2005 
Wages (with payroll) Utilities payment Purchase of goods, materials, services Capital expenditures Other 
 
UAH bn %  CB HCE UAH bn 
%  
CB HCE UAH bn 
%  
CB HCE UAH bn 
%  
CB HCE UAH bn 
%  
CB HCE
2000 2.48 50.76 0.56 11.40 1.32 26.96 0.33 6.81 0.20 4.06 
2001 3.26 50.45 0.59 9.16 1.76 27.25 0.49 7.59 0.36 5.55 
2002 4.10 54.45 0.65 8.67 2.07 27.52 0.56 7.46 0.14 1.89 
2003 5.10 52.57 0.80 8.20 2.67 27.47 0.91 9.42 0.23 2.34 
2004 6.42 52.81 0.83 6.83 3.04 24.97 1.62 13.3 0.25 2.09 
2005 9.33 60.28 0.92 5.97 3.51 22.65 1.32 8.51 0.40 2.59 
Source: State Treasure Reports for 2000–2003, Ministry of Finance Budget Reports. 
Administratively increased wages result in lack of funds for capital spending, which does not allow 
health establishment to modernize their equipment and implement new types of diagnosis. In 2005, 
less than 30% of the health care budget was spent for purchases of goods, materials and services; 
and roughly 6% constituted the utilities bill. Capital expenditures constituted in 2005 around 8.5% 
of total health care expenditures. However, from this amount only 60% was used as investment into 
equipment and purchase of durable goods (see Appendix A4). Due to rather low investment, re-
placement of old infrastructure and equipment is very slow. According to the WHO the replacement 
ratio of most health facilities is about 2% (Lekhan, 2004).  
To sum up, the public spending is directed towards financing the existing status quo in health care, 
investments remain low, and restructuring of the sector is hampered. 
Spending by functional categories: As it was argued above, the most health care providers in 
Ukraine are hospitals rather than policlinics. On average 80% of spending is attributed to financing 
inpatient care. The preventive care remains underdeveloped. The level of health care financing as 
well as its structure varies between regions (see Fig. 3). Basically, data reveals that high-income 
regions provide the residents with better-financed health care services, what again mirrors the dif-
ferent access to health care services among regions. 
Lack of managerial autonomy, incentives and absence of competition 
The existing system relies on health care planning and regulation by central and local authorities. 
The managers of health care establishments lack incentives and abilities to increase efficiency and 
responsiveness to patients needs. The principle of purchase of medicine on the central level creates 
a situation when HCPs lack necessary medicine, while having a stock of needless medicine.  
At present, health care providers (HCPs) administer broad budgets, where funds are allocated not 
according to provided services, but to the existing facilities. In such a system patients are seen as a 
cost factor and an item of spending, where each additional patient and treatment cuts into the 
budget. HCPs have few incentives to become more productive as this has no impact on the budget 
(Handrich, 2005). 
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Fig. 3. Health care per capita expenditures in 2005, UAH. 
Source: The State Statistical Office of Ukraine 
Besides, there are difficulties with receiving extrabudgetary funds by HCPs due to their status of 
budget entities and some legislative loopholes. The HCPs are restricted in receiving private pay-
ments for the treatments, as according to the Constitution they should provide all services free of 
charge. Besides, the legislation does not foresee the possibility for them to receive money from 
insurance companies. But still the heads of the HCPs find their way to work with insurance com-
panies. Often, the heads of HCP stand behind the decision on creation charitable funds and health 
cash desks, what make it possible for the health care establishment to receive extra-budgetary 
funds.  
Patient's choice and competition between health care providers (HCPs) are almost absent in the sec-
tor due to the administrative 'catchment' principle directing patients for receiving "free" medical 
services at the public clinic/ hospital at their official place of residence.  
Where private and public HCP could compete for privately paid medical services the rules differ. 
For example, private HCP are prohibited by regulation to issue sick-leave documents. Many restric-
tions prevent the market entry of private HCP, like the prohibition to open private maternity hospi-
tal and mental hospital. Besides, even though by the Law the private health care establishments 
have a right to use narcotics while treating patient, the respective government resolution restricts 
this right: private establishments can use only anesthetics, but not narcotics. Therefore, the private 
HCP cannot make surgery with anesthetization with a use of narcotics, which is often needed. Be-
sides, private emergency cannot make an injection of narcotic in case a person has myocardial in-
farction — the private emergency then has to call public one and ask them to make an injection. 
Very important issue is a de-facto restriction of the right of private health care provider to partici-
pate in local tenders for health care services. 
The lack of competition and management autonomy creates weak incentives for public HCP to de-
liver high quality medical services and work more productively.  
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3.3. Regulation and development of the private health insurance in Ukraine 
The existence of private health insurance (PHI) in Ukraine is foreseen in the Law 'On Insurance' 
(approved in 1996). The Law stipulates general conditions for insurance, such as insurance risks, 
exceptions from insurance cases, restrictions, etc. The detailed insurance conditions (e.g. insurance 
premiums, terms and conditions of insurance payments) are defined in an insurance contract. There 
is no real legal rule defining relationship between public health care system and PHI. Basically, the 
PHI plays a role of substitute for public financing as gives a chance to people to be treated better. 
For now, there is no legal regulation of the cooperation of insurance companies and health care es-
tablishments. The insurance companies do not have a way to influence directly the quality of ser-
vices provided by the HCP. Legislation lacks clear provisions that define basis and procedures for 
establishing fees for health care. Therefore, the price of services depends on the bargaining power 
of insurance company and health care establishment.  
Only near 1% of population is covered by health insurance. Low incomes of Ukrainians are one of 
the major factors of poor development of the PHI. Another explanation is a little trust to the private 
insurance companies. The share of the PHI in the structure of health care expenditures remains low 
(around 0.5–2.0%). Most of health care establishments are not included into the PHI schemes.  
The insurance premiums differ from USD 100 and USD 800 per year depending on the volumes of 
health care services, list of health care providers, etc. Insurers foresee restrictions on the provision 
of different services and drugs. Often the treatment of chronic illnesses is not covered by the PHI.  
In Ukraine most incentives to purchase a PHI are attributed to the failures of the public health care 
system, e.g. a desire to overcome the restrictions of the 'catchment' principles, the jump over long 
waiting lines in public hospitals and poor health care provision. Patients that have or had private 
health insurance policy are rather satisfied by care they receive. During focus groups and interviews 
they acknowledge that insurance policy grants an opportunity to receive higher quality health care. 
They also mentioned time saving and, as a result, easier access to health care services. On the other 
hand, patients argue the PHI does not always stimulate health personnel to provide quality health 
care services. The explanation of such behavior was found after the discussions and interviews with 
health personnel. In particular, health personnel often consider treatment of patients with PHI policy 
as an additional task, as they either are not paid additionally for this or are paid very low benefit 
(see Story 1). Therefore, the PHI does not solve the problem of low working incentives for health 
personnel. 
Story 1. Health establishment X has a contract with insurance company Y and is obliged to provide 
clients of insurance company Y with full complex of medical services. The client of insurance com-
pany Y approaches medical doctor A working in health establishment X and specializing in, for in-
stance, neuropathology. The consultation was about 20 minutes. Of course insurance company Y 
pays something to health establishment X for providing such services. However, a particular doctor, 
who treated patient, does not necessarily receive additional money from his employer (health estab-
lishment X). Even in the opposite case, the amount of payment for time spent for service provision 
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to patient with private insurance policy is significantly lower than possible "shadow" payment from 
patient who pays "out of pocket". In its turn, the amount of bonus, which might be paid in this par-
ticular situation by health establishment X to doctor A, is calculated in the following way. The 
month salary of Doctor A is about UAH 500. The doctor per hour rate is about UAH 2.7. He treats 
patient about 20 min. As a result, the bonus received by doctor for providing the service is about 
UAH 0.9 (approximately USD 0.18). 
The doctors are sometimes restricted by insurance companies to the certain list of drug and diagnostic 
examinations, which sometimes is not sufficient for providing quality health care. Thus, health per-
sonnel stressed that PHI policy does not always ensure patients in receiving high quality health care. 
Special attention should be paid to attitude of heads of health establishments to private health insur-
ance. They perceive PHI to be very useful for the health establishments, since they are aware how 
additional funds received from insurance companies are spent. According to them major purposes 
of spending money received through PHI are the following: (1) restoration / maintenance of prem-
ises (2) purchase of medical supplies, (3) improvement of equipment capacities, and (4) bonuses for 
health personnel. At the same time, health personnel mentioned that administrative premises, of-
fices of department heads rather than medical premises are first subject of restoration.  
To sum up, patients are satisfied with private health care insurance and are pretty sure that such insur-
ance can ensure receiving quality health care. But, they note that insurance sometimes fails to bring 
attention of doctors, while informal payments reach this goal. Health personnel have suspicious and 
uncertain attitude to the PHI, as they perceive it as settlement of additional work, which does not pro-
vide them with sufficient remuneration. Indeed, heads of health establishments, knowing how funds 
from insurance are spent, evaluate cooperation with private health insurance rather highly. 
3.4. Solving the problem at local level — alternative to the private health insurance 
On the regional level the problem of insufficient government financing of the health care is solved 
through creation of so-called 'likarniani kasy', which is kind-of a sick-funds. Such organizations ba-
sically fall into the category of 'commercialization' measures, as authorities or other organizations, 
patients and health care providers appear in legal financial relationships. 
The sick-funds are not regulated in Ukraine by specific legislation. The legislation on either chari-
table organizations or public unions is usually applied. Sick-funds are often created as public non-
profit organizations that promote provision of quality health care and protect patient's rights. The 
participation in such organizations is voluntary. The number of sick-funds in Ukraine approaches 
200 and according to some estimations number of participants might reach 5 m persons. According 
to available data 61.8% of sick-funds work as public unions, while the 31.2% work as charitable 
funds. The revenues of sick-funds are comprised of membership contributions of individuals or le-
gal entities. Their activity is aimed at provision of health care, which cannot be received at the ex-
pense of government financing. On average more than 50% of revenues is spent for pharmaceuti-
cals, and 30% is directed towards purchasing medical equipment, materials and diagnostic examina-
tions. Around 10% of funds is spent for improving qualification of health personnel and additional 
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payments to them. Zhytomyr, Mykolayiv, Kharkiv and Kirovograd oblasts are the most active in 
forming sick-funds.  
The development of the sick-funds seems to be the best in Zhytomyr oblast. Since this experience is 
recognized to be the most valuable, and showed that it ensures improvements in the health care pro-
vision, it is shortly presented in this chapter. 'Likarniana kasa of Zhytomyr oblast' (sick-fund — LK) 
was created in 2000 as non-profit, noncommercial, charitable organization by Zhytomyr oblast or-
ganization of the Red Cross, Zhytomyr oblast committee of trade union of health personnel, and 
Association of nurses of Zhytomyr oblast. While the sick-fund was first created only in the City, its 
experience was then implemented in all oblast districts according to the special decision of local 
authorities. The main goal of the LK is to conduct activities aimed at improvement of health care 
provision to members of the LK in case of their sickness through provision of medicines, diagnostic 
services and consultation during day inpatient treatment, and outpatient treatment in health estab-
lishments of Zhytomyr oblast; as well as promotion of developing health care sector in the region, 
improvement of health care provision, introduction of new forms of diagnostics and treatment. 
Therefore, collected funds are used for: medicines, diagnostic tests, supporting material and equip-
ment basis of health establishment, introduction of new technologies, and charitable aid to members 
of the LK. As of July, 2006, around 14.14% of oblast population were members of the LK, from 
whom 56% working persons, 23% — children, 12% — pensioners. In the first half of 2006, 77.4% 
of received funds were spent on purchasing medicines and products of medical means. The rest 
were administrative expenditures (wages, capital expenditures, etc.) 
There are defined two possible forms of becoming a member of the LK: collective (all employees of 
one enterprise become members of the LK according to the collective agreement) or individual. All 
citizens can be members of the LK, including children (children up to 18 years old become mem-
bers if one of the parents is a member of the LK). The fees for participating in the LK can be paid 
either by individual or by employer. The membership fee does not depend on the income level, but 
is set at the flat level of 3% of minimum wage with the discounts for children and students.  
The LK has signed agreements with the number of health establishments. According to agreements 
the LK provides health establishments with medicines, reagent and other materials as targeted chari-
table assistance. The LK also cooperates with family physicians. In every health care establishment, 
with which the LK works, there are special medical experts who make sure that treatment is done 
correctly and according to the standards.  
The LK has clear rules of treatment including coverage and restrictions. The treatment, which is 
financed at the expense of the LK, includes only therapy of the main disease and its complications 
during 12 days. The continuation of treatment at the expense of the LK over 12 days (but not more 
than 24 days) is possible only in case of in-patient treatment after the respective decision of the con-
sultation between specialized doctors.  
The positive features of the activity of the LK include the rules of coverage and restrictions, which 
are hotly debated by policy makers. Besides, the membership fee is set at the flat level. Therefore, 
experience of the Zytomyr LK can be really valuable while developing policies for reforming health 
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care system in Ukraine, especially taking into account that government tries to keep government 
financing and introduce another pillar of financing in the form of insurance. 
3.5. The actual working of the health care system 
The important question for any transitional social system is how the institutions work in reality. In 
order to respond to this question during, during the focus groups and interviews we have discussed 
such issues as: (1) main problems of health care system from patients (2) financial principles of 
hospital works (3) professional ethic and work incentives for heath care personnel towards work.  
Main problems of health care system  
The perception of main problems of health care system by patients and doctors is different. The pa-
tients stressed on the following problems: 
1. Impossibility to receive quality state guaranteed health care without 'informal payment'; 
2. No guarantee of timely provision of quality health care even in case of 'informal payment'; 
3. Insufficient qualification of health personnel; 
4. Careless attitude of health personnel to patients. 
According to the health personnel the main problems of health care system are the following: 
1. Low salary, which does not reflect the social role of health personnel in the society; 
2. Poor material, technical and diagnostics basis of hospitals; 
3. Low incentives for professional development; 
4. Careless attitude of patients to their health. 
While health personnel stated that they provide quality services, patients do worry about the quality 
even in case of informal payments. Both groups of stakeholders blame each other for lack of atten-
tion: while patients think that they do not receive sufficient attention from doctors, doctors believe 
that patients should be more responsible for their health. According to doctors' opinion, absence of 
care-seeking behavior of patients is one of the key problems today. Both patients and health person-
nel indicated the low level of prophylactic measures. According to focus groups discussion with 
patients, lack of confidence in doctor and informal payments are key reasons of unwillingness of 
people to go for prophylactic measures. People often visit a doctor only when having tremendous 
health problems. 
The interesting fact is that health personnel claims that low incentives for professional development 
of doctors, in particular promotion incentives, is a problem of health care sector. Often, wages of 
highly qualified doctors do not really differ from the wages of not qualified health personnel.  
Heads of health care establishments about financing problems 
The qualitative analysis has indicated that heads of health care establishments apply two basic ap-
proaches while dealing with insufficient financing: the structural changes and the fund raising. The 
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structural measures include: (1) decrease in the number of permanent health personnel (especially it 
concerns nurses), (2) temporary forced leave of permanent heath personnel, (3) energy saving, (4) 
reduction of numbers of beds (after receiving permits from responsible authorities). Often, heads of 
health care establishment look for additional funds and refer to: (1) provision of paid services (often 
through opened charitable funds or hospital cash desks, where patients have to pay contributions), 
(2) contracts with insurance company, (3) leasing free premises. Sometimes, patients have a possi-
bility to pay officially for being served faster, being in a nice room in the hospital, etc. The alloca-
tion of extra funds is defined by heads of health care establishments and typically includes mainte-
nance of premises, purchase of medical supplies, improvement of equipment capacities, and bo-
nuses for health personnel. 
Professional ethics of Ukrainian health personnel 
The professional ethics of Ukrainian health personnel is rather complex issue. On the one hand, pa-
tients-respondents claimed that often when they go to a different doctor they hear a question: 'what 
a stupid doctor has treated you?' On the other hand, there exists the principle of 'mutual responsibil-
ity' in the sector, what makes it impossible for the patient to execute their rights on proper treat-
ment. 
Another problem is a moral dilemma of accepting shadow payments by health personnel. During 
focus groups of health personnel the respondents sounded like accepting the behavior of shadow 
payments as well as perceiving it as appropriate. At the same time, all responding health workers 
claimed that their attention is the same regardless the fact whether patient pays anything or not, 
which was not supported by answers of patients, who claimed that the attitude is really different. 
However, responding health workers defined the group of 'some' who treats differently patients due 
to the fact of payment or not. 
Work incentives of health personnel 
While analyzing work incentives for health personnel, we segregated five work incentives for health 
personnel (see Table 4), which correspond to the list of incentives, derived by other researchers 
(Benett, 1999). The qualitative part of analysis has indicated that only two out of five defined incen-
tives are present in Ukraine, in particular, desire to be socially beneficial and possibility to receive 
"shadow" income. However, the latter incentive was evaluated by patients as being against of hu-
man moral norms. Therefore, in Ukraine work incentives for health personnel are rather weak, what 
does not allow for improving quality of health care provided, and increasing productivity.  
3.6. Informal payments: pillar of the system 
In Ukraine, the health care sector is characterized by prevalence of informal payments, which re-
duce the access to the health care, especially for poor households.5 These payments contribute to 
                                                 
5 Under informal payment we understand the direct payment of patient to health personnel for health care services the 
person is entitled to for free. 
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delays in care-seeking behavior of patients. The qualitative analysis indicated that possibility to re-
ceive 'informal payments' is one of the work incentives of health personnel and at the same time one 
of the reason of patients' frustration. Our findings indicate that the problem of informal payments in 
this sector is institutional one. The system of informal payments creates the paradox. On the one 
hand, the system of informal payments is unable to equalize access to the health care, as poor are 
still restricted from quality health care. On other hand, this is almost the only mechanism that makes 
the system work. In Ukraine, the informal payments bring equilibrium outcome, though not an effi-
cient one.  
Table 4. List of work incentives of health personnel 
 List of Incentives 
How respondents  
and focus group 
participants perceive 
the particular 
incentive? 
Is this a work 
incentive in 
Ukrainian conditions? 
Is this incentive 
positively evaluated 
according to human 
moral norms? 
1. Desire to be socially beneficial More or less 
satisfactory 
Yes Yes 
2. Level of official salary Low No Yes 
3. Possibility to receive "shadow" 
income 
High Yes No 
4. Differentiation of official salary of 
medical doctors according to level 
of their qualification 
Absent de facto No Yes 
5. Differentiation of official income 
of doctors according to treatment 
provided to patients 
Absent de facto No Yes 
The results of focus groups and interviews revealed that quality health care could be received as an 
exception ("if a person is lucky"). Usually, in order to receive quality health care a person should 
informally pay to doctor. The situation is similar both for being treated in hospitals and policlinics. 
Moreover, patients receiving treatment in public health establishment should not only pay infor-
mally for doctor's consultation, but also pay for drugs, bandages, and other consumables. 
Many respondents claimed that approaching the recommended doctors is the best way to receive 
quality health care. Therefore, often people try to look for doctor they are acquainted with or rec-
ommended to. In this case, a person again takes a decision to pay for the health care informally.  
While analyzing results of focus groups and interviews we find three main reasons why patients 
prefer to make "informal payments". First, patients pay before treatment in order to ensure receiving 
a good and careful treatment. Second, they pay before treatment in order to receive health care ser-
vices of sufficient quality. Third, they pay after treatment if they are satisfied with the quality of 
provided health care services. Therefore, while the first two reasons play a role of insurance policy, 
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the latter one is made in the form of gratitude. On the point of view of patients, the informal pay-
ments are more efficient way to insure them from bad treatment, than purchasing policy from insur-
ance company. 
Very important issue is a de-facto restriction of the right of private health care provider to partici-
pate in local tenders for health care services. 
According to health care specialists, informal payments from patients are mainly made due to two 
reasons. In particular, patients pay before the treatment in order to ensure sufficient conditions for 
providing health care and after the treatment when they are satisfied with health care services pro-
vided. During the interviews, the health personnel explained that under sufficient conditions for 
providing health care they mean better room, better medicine, etc.  
While reasoning of 'after' payments is similar by content both for patients and health personnel, 
meaning gratitude, the reasoning of the 'before' payments differ. Patients are rather unanimous in 
arguing that they would not receive quality treatment unless they informally pay for that. Indeed, 
the health personnel stated that they treat equally patients who pay or does not pay for their treat-
ment. Basically, they referred to Hippocratic oath and assured us that each doctor treats patient 
carefully and nicely without any relation to fact of "informal payments". But, patients informed 
about abundance of examples when person does not receive any health care without informal pay-
ment. None of our respondents or participants of focus groups discussion evaluated the necessity of 
"out of pocket" payment as completely negative phenomenon. Of course, in general it is perceived 
to be rather negative, but respondents said that they are ready to pay and consider this as an ac-
cepted behavior.6 Patients usually claim that the major reason of informal payments is low wages of 
health personnel. Indeed, health personnel argued that even in case of increase of their wages it is 
impossible to guarantee that practice of taking informal payments from patients would disappear 
immediately. According to them it became a "habit" from side of patient and even rather part of 
such social ritual as a "visit to doctor". 
Story 2. A woman of 55 years old was transported to the hospital with simple fracture of leg. Doc-
tor inspected her and her leg was put into plaster. Next several days she does not fell any attention 
from side of health personnel. And only after informal payment to the head of department, doctor 
provided her with needed treatment. 
Story 3. Woman of 50 years old was transported to the hospital with hypertensic crisis. During 3 
hours nobody came to her. And only after her relatives provided with money the doctor who was on 
duty, the woman was examined by. 
During focus groups health personnel claimed that there are no poor doctors, meaning that they can 
earn enough money in the form of informal payments, if they are qualified and smart enough. At the 
same time they claim that there are higher chances to earn more in hospitals. The answers on share 
of incomes received from informal payments differed. While talking about themselves they claimed 
                                                 
6 Norm is defined following Durkheim (1995). It is social fact that widely distributed with society.  
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that the share of informal payments did not exceed 10%, but for the group of 'some' this share 
reached 70–80% of total income. 
It seems that there is no scheme of distributing informal payments. The health personnel usually 
keeps what was received. There were identified cases, when the doctor (often dentists) are paying 
rent to health care establishment for their room and equipment and then freely takes whatever was 
earned. 
To sum up, informal payments became a usual social norm of Ukrainian society at least in mental-
ity of Ukrainians. This is a mechanism that produces some kind of equilibrium in the health care 
system. Though this equilibrium s not an efficient one, informal payments become one of the chal-
lenge of health care reforms in Ukraine. 
4. HEALTH CARE IN POLITICAL AGENDA AND RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
In this section we present the agenda of health care policies in Ukraine. The section starts with the 
findings of interviews with policy makers and analysis of the programs of several parties made. 
Then we proceed to the description of recent policies in health care sector.  
4.1. Policy makers about health care system of Ukraine 
The results of interviews with policy makers indicate that there is no unified perception of problems 
and clear vision of reforms in health care sector among policy makers. The common points of view 
might be summarized as follows: 
1. The article of the Constitution on free health care provision is not likely to be changed. 
2. The term of 'free health care' should be clearly defined. Basically, all policy makers agreed that 
there should be a certain level of guaranteed by state health care. 
3. In case of introduction of compulsory health insurance, the contribution should be a part of uni-
fied social tax, which is still to be introduced. If health insurance contribution causes the in-
crease in overall payroll tax, the share of shadow wages will increase. 
4. There is a necessity for public control over the health care system in Ukraine, meaning that ac-
countability of health sector should be increased.  
4.2. Political parties about health care reform 
In March 2006 Ukraine had Parliamentary elections. According to the results, the following parties 
got to the parliament: party "Regions of Ukraine", Block of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT), "Public Un-
ion 'Nasha Ukraina", Socialist party of Ukraine (SPU) and Communist party of Ukraine (CPU).7 
                                                 
7 The research team participated in the project on drafting Suggestions to Coalition agreement for the future Parliament 
coalition (see Appendix A6). 
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The analysis of the programs of these parties shows that the health care reform becomes high in the 
agenda. However, except for "Nasha Ukraina", other parties failed to present sound suggestions on 
their view of reforms in this sector.  
The common position of the parties is a combination of current tax financed system with compul-
sory health insurance. The difference between the positions concerns the fact whether it would be 
private or state insurance system, and who and how will be contributing to this system. While deal-
ing with the issue of sources of financing (taxes vs. insurance contributions), the parties do not de-
vote attention to the correction of structural failures of the system. However, as experience of other 
countries suggests the increase in financing does not correct failures of health system in the long 
run. Basically, the "Nasha Ukraina" and the BYT only indicate that such structural changes as in-
troduction of institute of family doctors, changes of financing principles as well as higher attention 
to primary health care, are required. But they lack a clear vision on approaches of incorporating 
these elements into the system.  
The Parliament Coalition (formed in late June 2006) rather generally formulated its strategy on 
health care reforms. The Coalition agreement foresees the health care reform through prioritized 
development of primary health care, diagnosis of different illnesses and introduction of compulsory 
professional examinations.  
To sum up, though political forces have declared health care reform being high in their political 
agenda, they have not yet developed clear measures to be taken for every announced reforming 
step.  
4.3. Policy developments 
Ukrainian legislation lacks the comprehensive concept of health care reforms, which would stipu-
late what type of health system is to be built in the country after reforms. The views on health re-
forms by different policy-makers are fragmented and concentrate mainly on the issue of increasing 
financing. 
During recent years, the government has not proceeded far on the way of health care reform, though 
several program documents were developed and discussed in the public. The major issues discussed 
were provision of primary care by family doctors and introduction of compulsory state health insur-
ance (approximately in 2009). The switch to contracting basis of purchasing health care services is 
foreseen in the programs. But, there is a lack of developed approaches on the implementation of 
these steps.  
The Coalition Government proclaimed the comprehensive reforms in the sector, starting with the 
introduction of compulsory health insurance. The insurance is to be financed at the expense of con-
tributions attached to wages. This is envisaged in the draft laws, developed by two Ministries simul-
taneously — the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. The procedure of 
drafting two draft laws within the government indicates once again, that there is no single view on 
even one aspect of the health reform — health insurance. The draft laws are rather different in fore-
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seeing the contribution rates payments, administration of the health insurance, etc. The draft laws 
do not envisage any other reforms needed in the sector.  
Simultaneously, the people deputies drafted and registered a draft law on the introduction of health 
insurance. According to the draft, the health insurance is to be provided only by state health insur-
ance company, which will create monopolization of the health insurance market. The contributions 
are to be set be set as at a flat rate, which might be considered as a positive step.  
To sum up, the Government as well as the Parliament concentrates mainly on the necessity to in-
crease health care financing. Much less attention is devoted to the implementation of reforms aimed 
at improving efficiency and quality in the sector.  
5. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The transformation from the central planning towards the market-based relationships in the health 
care sector implies the risks of reopening the market imperfections. Some transition countries intro-
duced the market forces to overcome the failures of the health care system mainly related to the 
over excessive government regulation. The reforms in these countries are mainly aimed at the rede-
fining the role of the government and switching to the market mechanisms, while regulating the re-
lationships in the health care sector. The governments implement steps towards more efficient real-
location of resources through market mechanisms, reinforcement of the institutional capacity 
through the decentralization of the management responsibilities. Many transition countries involved 
the managed competition for improvement of the efficiency and targeting subsidies for prevention 
the market failures. The privatization of health establishments was often used for improving effi-
ciency of health care provision. 
In this chapter we devote attention to international experience on regulating or reforming selected 
issues of health care system, in particular, management independence and commercialization, work-
ing incentives for health personnel, and financing principles.  
5.1. Financing principles 
There are different principles of financing health care (see Table 5). Beveridge type of health care is 
mostly or only financed at the expense of public funds. The social insurance is predominant in Bis-
marck type. For Beveridge and Bismarck systems the performance or fee-for-services financing prin-
ciple are typical. In Semashko type, financing is allocated to fund the existing health sector infrastruc-
ture. The voluntary private insurance is developed in all countries, providing better access to health 
care services to population. In many OECD countries PHI rarely exceeds 12% of total health care ex-
penditures reflecting the nature of PHI as of additional element to the public health care system. 
While reforming health care system, many countries tried to change the financing principle. Some 
countries, in particular Poland and Czech Republic, have tried to change this through introduction of 
health insurance. However, they found it complicated to succeed on the way of such reform.  
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Table 5. Payment system in OECD and Ukraine 
 Predominant type  of Health care system 
Share of population 
covered by PHI (%) 
Share of PHI in total 
health expenditures (%) PHI in % GDP 
France Bismarck 86 12.8 1.20 
USA Private insurance 70.3 34.8 4.59 
Canada Beveridge 70 11.2 1.03 
Australia Beveridge 44 7.1 0.65 
Germany Bismarck 10 12.5 1.34 
Ukraine Semashko 1 0.25 0.01 
Source: Docteur (2003), Colombo (2003), the Ministry of Health Care of Ukraine. 
Both national financing and insurance can bring good performing results as well as have some 
drawbacks. The more important are the principles of health sector financing, as they should moti-
vate good performance and efficiency of health sector (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Provider payment system and incentive effect 
Incentive effect 
Payment type Definition Incentive to 
increase 
activity 
Incentive to 
decrease 
activity 
Incentive to 
shift patient' 
cost to 
others 
Incentive to 
target to 
poor 
Controls 
cost of 
doctor 
employment 
Fee-for-services Payment for each 
medical act 
Yes No No Maybe No 
Salary Payment per unit  
of time input  
(e.g. per moth) 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Capitation Payment per patient 
for care within a 
given period  
(e.g. a year) 
No Yes Yes No Yes 
Source: Maynard (2006), p.148. 
According to Dubois (2006), the challenge of reforms in former Soviet Union countries is that they 
contain paradox of aiming to reward performance and empower management and health personnel, 
while at the same time implementing downsizing and redundancy.  
The Estonian reform is a nice example how the system can be changed. In particular, it reduced 
overcapacity of hospitals through their closure and merges, rationalized services, corporatized hos-
pitals, and introduced fee-for-service principle of financing. Due to the latter, HCPs restructured 
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production process, changed input mix and reorganized services (Figueras, 2005). The results of the 
reforms were not as encouraging as expected as the government was reluctant to close hospitals.  
5.2. Managerial independence and commercialization  
International reform experience in countries with tax financed public health care systems demon-
strates that the introduction of market-type relationships and elements of competition into public 
(local) "monopolies" like hospitals could lead to significant improvements of services supplied 
with higher qualities at more affordable costs (Jakab, 2002). In combination with incentive regu-
lation the public owned health care sector could increase its efficiency and service quality, and 
introduce better responsiveness to the patients. As international experience suggests, for achiev-
ing this goal the government may commercialize and liberalize the management of hospitals. One 
option would be to contract out the management of hospitals to independent profit oriented man-
agement companies or trusts, while the hospitals would remain in public ownership. Policy-
makers usually choose from a wide range of options for such private sector participation (also 
known as public-private partnerships PPP) from short-term service and management contracts  
(1–5 years), medium term lease contracts (10–15 years).8 The terms and conditions of such PPPs 
need to be specified for each case. In cases where the management company or trust is not fulfill-
ing its contract obligations or is going bankrupt the hospital remaining in public ownership would 
be given to another operator. Almost all European countries use today mixed (owned), but so-
cially responsible health care delivery systems. 
One step further would be the outright privatization of hospital. In particular, in Sweden, in 1998 all 
hospitals (except for emergencies) were put on the market, while the universal health care system 
financed from public funds was maintained.9 Nevertheless, the government introduced the guaran-
tees for some important operations. As a result, introduced reforms increased the productivity and 
efficiency of the health care system in Sweden. The privatization of health establishments was also 
applied in Czech Republic, where about 95% of primary health care as well as nearly entire network 
of outpatient services and pharmacy services was privatized. In certain cases, communities became 
the owners and operators of small hospitals, while doctors, pharmacists, and other operators are of-
ten the owners of outpatient services and pharmacies. Small hospitals were often privatized as 
commercial companies, but were further financed from statutory health insurance.  
The government also should create incentives for equitable care provision. One of the elements of 
incentives could become a case-based payment. This principle is aimed at ensuring all people to be 
                                                 
8 A brief overview of various options and models for public hospitals is provided in Public Policy for the Private Sector: 
Public Hospitals: Options for Reform trough Public-Private Partnerships. World Bank Group, private sector and Infra-
structure Network, Note Number 241, January 2002. 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/241Taylo-010802.pdf 
9 Hjertqvist, Johan, Turning to the private sector in health care: The Swedish example, Montreal Economic Institute, 
Economic Note October 2003.  
http://www.opas.org.br/servico/Arquivos/Destaque963.pdf  
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treated in the public hospital regardless who manages it. Therefore, the floor and ceiling estimates 
and even a description of case mix can be provided for every particular hospital taking into account 
a demographic and health situation in the region.  
5.3. Independent regulator and purchasing health care services 
As experience of other countries reveal, success of reforms also depends on the independence and 
credibility of the public regulator. In this way the conflict interest potentially arising from the fact 
that the public sector is shareholder and regulator at the same time is avoided. 
The health care performance can be improved by changing the models of purchasing in health sec-
tor. All models, either national health services or social health insurance, have some common ele-
ments for purchasing: 'linking of health needs, plans and priorities to the allocation of resources or 
decentralizing provider management and introducing competition between providers' (Figueras, 
2005). While developing purchasing principles, the broad approach should contain rules for con-
tracting, payment principles, competition between providers, etc. Before defining a contract condi-
tions, the government clearly identifies the needs for health care services, the cost-efficiency of dif-
ferent treatment, ways of purchasing health care services, and list of health care providers.  
5.4. Motivation of health personnel 
The evidence and theory reveal that motivation of health personnel is important for high perform-
ance of health care sector. The independence of management of HCPs is essential for motivation of 
health personnel. The empirical evidence suggests that linking performance to promotion leads to 
improved productivity and better motivation (Benett, 1999). Therefore, while defininf the remu-
neration of health personnel the services they provide and their qualification should be taken into 
account. Some studies indicate that rather job satisfaction, training, responsibility, promotion and 
recognition than a pay level are primary motivation for better work of health personnel.10 The feed-
back of patients plays an important role in emphasizing the performance of health workers. Often, 
the Hippocratic oath is considered to be a type of motivation. On the contrary, poor management, 
lack of materials and equipment serve as demotivation factors. 
6. CURRENT REFORM AGENDA 
6.1. Summary 
The major features of Ukrainian health sector could be summarized as follows: 
• the health care reform is only declared, but nothing specific has been done; 
• the principle of financing existing HCPs rather than services provided; 
                                                 
10 See for details Dubois (2006), Benett (1999), Dieleman (2006), Manongi (2006), etc. 
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• provision of health care services rather on the hospital than on primary level; 
• the coverage of priority services through private sector is restricted; 
• there is an inequity of health care generation and allocation patterns; 
• the motivation of health personnel is rather absent and managerial autonomy is restricted. 
The performance and quality should be the major subjects for health care reforms in Ukraine. While 
elaborating policy recommendations the restrictions on reforms should be taken into account. The 
major restriction in Ukraine is an existence of equilibrium in the sector, which is created and sup-
ported by informal payments. So, some stakeholders benefit from the status quo and might oppose 
reforms.  
6.2. Reform measures for improving health care system: point of view of main stakeholders 
The reforms in any countries can hardly be successful, if they are not supported by the stakeholders 
they are aimed for. One of the aims of the qualitative part of the research was also to clarify the ex-
pectations of patients and health personnel concerning health reforms in Ukraine. The findings of 
focus groups and interviews indicated that people expect implementation of following reforms: 
• The salaries of health personnel should be increased to the sufficient level, which corresponds 
to their social role. Besides, the differentiation of salaries should be ensured.  
• Health personnel should be provided with conditions, which enable them to provide quality 
health care. So, equipment and diagnostic capacities of health providers should be improved.  
• The system of incentives for professional growth of health personnel should be introduced. This 
includes possibility of trainings and carrier growth. 
• The role of the preventive and prophylactic measures as well as awareness among population 
concerning the responsibility for their health should be increased. 
6.3. Policy recommendations 
The biggest challenge of any health care reform is represented by the absence of the first best solu-
tion for reform that would suit all countries. The reforms and the system, which is built as a result, 
largely depend on the historical developments, mentality of population as well as values of policy 
makers in the country. This should be taken into account while elaborating policies and drafting a 
comprehensive concept of health care reforms. In this chapter we present our point of view on the 
way of reforms in Ukraine. We believe that reforms in Ukraine should be conducted in two major 
stages: 
1. Undertake reforms aimed at correcting deficiencies and improving efficiency of the health sector; 
2. Turn to the issue of introduction of compulsory health insurance. 
Stage 1: While conducting the first stage reform measures, one of the most important goals that 
should be reached is the reduction of informal payments. For this the government should put efforts 
Economics Education and Research Consortium: Russia and CIS 
 
 
29
in order to renew the trust of people in public health care, raise salaries of health personnel, ensure 
good quality of health care and improve accountability and transparency of HCP. 
As the government does not have sufficient funds to provide all health care services free of charge, 
the list of state guaranteed health care should be brought in line with the available funds in the 
health care sector. While defining the list of guaranteed health care the experience of the Zhytomyr 
LK might be considered. Such approach is more suitable for Ukraine taking into account the current 
situation. First, the widespread poverty makes private financing affordable only for few. Second, 
the introduction of the compulsory health insurance is not also a option for Ukraine due to the 
demographic situation (ageing and shrinking contribution base) and already high payroll tax. If the 
health contribution is added, the wage payments will be push further into the shadow. Besides, in-
troduction of compulsory health insurance in a present structure of the system will only increase 
spending, which are wasted. Therefore, in the meantime Ukraine should keep tax financed health 
care system with defined guaranteed list of health care services covered. 
Budget allocation should be switched to the fee-for-services basis. This means that local govern-
ment entities should contract the health care establishments and pay them for actually provided ser-
vices and not for assigned number of potential patients and infrastructure the health care establish-
ment has. The international experience indicates that such a financing scheme creates incentives for 
the health establishment to restructure and work more efficiently. Simultaneously, the HSP should 
be granted a status of economic entities, which would enable them to operate own budgets as well 
as receive extra-budgetary funds. Of course, we admit that after such reform, which should be ac-
companied with the cancellation of 'catchment' principle while providing state guaranteed health 
care free of charge, there will be a shift of patients' flows from one health care establishments to 
others. Therefore, some transition period for switching the financing principle should be introduced. 
However, in the middle run some health care establishments will be necessitated to restructure  
(e.g. reduce the number of beds, lease the unneeded rooms), limit the number of services provided, 
if they have not succeeded to attract enough patients through providing quality treatments. At the 
same time, the system of state subsidies of health care establishments in rural areas might take 
place. 
The introduction of fee-for-service financing scheme should be accompanies by the effective con-
trol on services actually provided. Otherwise, Ukraine might face the situation of high prices, provi-
sion of unnecessary services, etc. For making financing principles more transparent and clear the 
Ministry of Health should approve clear performance standards and valid quality indicators, includ-
ing measures for health outcomes. The methodology of price setting for health services should be 
defined. The Ministry of Health together with the Ministry of Finance should be responsible for de-
veloping principles of expenditure control on the level of both local authorities and level of health 
care establishments. The introduction of standards, price setting mechanisms and performance goals 
will enable the government to conduct sufficient monitoring the quality of heath care. 
While regulating prices the government might choose from a variety of options. The price should 
respond to the cost of health care provision by the most efficient provider (a benchmarking princi-
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ple). In Ukraine, where most of health care is provided by public sector, the government can also 
use the budget caps, which are set taking into account both levels of output as well as efficiency of 
hospitals. However, the government should be careful since restraining prices for a long time could 
limit the ability of HCP to attract qualified personnel. In order to avoid the switching of HCP to 
provision of the most expensive health care services, the government might use the case-mixed fi-
nancing. Later, in order to restrict households' consumption and demand of health care, the govern-
ment can introduce co-financing schemes, which has proven to reach the aim they are introduced 
for. Such co-payments will help to solve the moral hazard problem that exists otherwise. 
At the same time, the government should shape its policy on the application of market principles in 
the provision of health services. This should involve greater commercialization and freedom of con-
tractual relationships. In particular, the management principles should be changed. The management 
of the HCP should become autonomous in taking the decisions on employment, funds management, 
etc. The possibility of contracting the management, as it is done in many countries, should be also 
available. The heads of the health care establishments should be managers rather than doctors by the 
education. In such a situation they will be able to restructure the facilities and introduce incentives 
for work of health personnel. In particular, the remuneration of health personnel should depend on 
the treatments conducted as well as their qualification. Besides, the management of the HCP should 
introduce clear rules for promotion and training, as these are important elements of incentive 
scheme.  
While improving the performance of health care system, the government should ensure the competi-
tion between public providers as well as between public and private insurance companies. For this, 
equal rules of the game should apply for both public and private companies. The local self-
governments should have a possibility to contract not only public, but also private companies for 
providing health care. Consequently, the system of recording, accessing and transferring health data 
should be created.  
As not all health care is to be tax financed, the PHI will become important as would play a comple-
mentary role to the publicly financed health care system. So, the PHI should be clearly defined in its 
relation to the state guaranteed health care services. The regulation on the private health insurance 
should enable health personnel to provide quality health care. Besides, it might help in formalizing 
high informal payments as well as money spent for purchasing medicines. At the same time, the 
government should target existing medicine subsidies to the most vulnerable groups of population 
rather than to different categories of people. 
The policies also should aim at promoting health of the population. For this the role of preventive 
and prophylactic care should be increased. This will allow reducing expensive spending for special-
ized health care.11 Childhood immunization should be enhanced. The policies should concern not 
only prophylactic measurers, but also alcohol and tobacco use, nutrition, etc. In order to decrease 
                                                 
11 The evidence proves that increase in the hepatitis incidents occurred in Ukraine in the end of 90s and beginning of 
new century is explained by the lack of childhood immunization in the end of 80s and beginning of 90s. 
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alcohol and tobacco consumption the government might use experience of the OECD countries, in 
particular, conduct public awareness campaign, introduce advertising bans and increase respective 
taxes.12 
Stage 2: Only after the aforementioned reforms are implemented, deficiencies of the health care 
system are corrected, and efficiency increased the government can start working on the issue of in-
troducing compulsory health insurance. However, the government is better to reject the idea of in-
troducing compulsory state health insurance. Both state and private companies should be eligible 
for providing health insurance. This would ensure competition on the insurance market and will 
only be an advantage to population. The government instead should be responsible for the supervi-
sion and regulation of the health insurance market. In particular, the affordability of private insur-
ance by high-risk people should be ensured. As the OECD experience indicates, this might be done 
through fiscal incentives, subsidies and targeted regulation. Besides, the consumers should have an 
access to information, which would facilitate his/her choice of health care coverage. 
It is important to set an insurance contribution rate at a flat level. The wage-attached contribution 
will increase a payroll tax, what could contribute to the payment of wages in shadow, thus reducing 
the base for contribution payment. We believe, that local self-government should pay contributions 
on behalf of children and low-income people. At the same time, the level of contribution should be 
the same regardless the income level. 
In the long run the government should also consider such a market principle as privatization of 
some health establishments. As the experience of Sweden indicates, the privatization could be con-
ducted even under the tax financed health care system. As a result, the performance of HCP im-
proves. 
Current Ukrainian legislation on health policy is rather systematic and takes into account WHO 
standards. However, there is a significant law enforcement gap and some provisions of legislation 
are controversial. Therefore, the government should take steps towards improving enforcement of 
existing legislation as well as approve necessary legislation changes (see Appendix A6). 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
The health care sector in Ukraine remains unreformed, keeping the substantial overcapacities inher-
ited from the Soviet Union. The health care is declared to be free of charge, but private payments 
both formal and informal are common in Ukraine. Insufficient government financing created the 
situation that promoted segregation of population by the level of income, place of residence, and, 
thus, contradicts to the constitutional guarantee of free health care provision to all. As a result, the 
current health care system is delivers poor results and lacks equity. 
                                                 
12 See for details Towards High-Performing Health System (The OECD Health Project), 2004 (Brookings Institution Press). 
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The revealed drawbacks of the system include insufficient financing, improper funds allocation, 
lack of incentives, low managerial autonomy and absence of competition between providers. The 
absence of motivation for health personnel leads to poor performance. While the private health in-
surance helps people to receive health care services of better quality, it is not soundly regulated and 
plays rather substitutive than complementary role of the state financing system. In the situation of 
improper work of the health care system key stakeholders produced new rules of cooperation. For 
instance, patients are trying to overcome careless attitude of doctors and poor quality of health care 
services provided via informal payments. At the same time, the health personnel explains the need 
of informal payment by their low salaries as well as by poor material and diagnostic provision of 
health care establishments. However, new system of relations does not ensure equity and equal ac-
cess for Ukrainians. Besides, rather institutionalized informal payments do not guarantee provision 
of quality health care services, though they create some kind of equilibrium in the system. 
While both patients and health personnel anticipate the reforms, they do not have clear vision on 
what type of system is needed. At the same time, the policy makers, though defining health care re-
forms high in their agenda, failed to elaborate a concept of health care reforms in Ukraine. 
Our research has indicated that performance and quality should be the major subjects for health care 
reforms in Ukraine. While elaborating policy recommendations the restrictions on reforms should 
be taken into account. The major restriction in Ukraine is an existence of equilibrium in the sector, 
which is created and supported by informal payments.  
The reforms should ensure better finance allocation, improved incentives, more efficient manage-
ment, introduction of market elements, definition of role of key stakeholders, including government, 
health care providers (HCP), and patients. The policies should be aimed at creating regulated mar-
ket of health care provision, which is characterized by competition and will meet the needs of the 
population. After deficiencies of the health care system are corrected and efficiency increased the 
government can consider the possibility to introduce compulsory health insurance, which will be 
provided by both public and private health insurance companies. 
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APPENDICES 
A1. Parameters of the health care system of Ukraine and the EU-25 
Ukraine EU-25 
Parameters of the Health care (HC) system 
2000 2004 2000 2004 
Life expectancy at birth, in years 67.86 67.71 74.55 73.69 
Life expectancy at birth, in years, male 62.30 62.03 70.33 69.51 
Life expectancy at birth, in years, female 73.62 73.63 78.72 77.84 
Tuberculosis incidence per 100000 66.90 81.24 23.07 29.16 
Cancer incidence per 100000 317.93 329.73 437.88 411.78 
Cancer of the cervix, per 100000  6.60  2.51 
Hospitals per 100000 6.19 5.64 2.72 2.73 
Hospital beds per 100000 881.57 872.85 649.61 680.43 
Physicians per 100000 300.44 301.27 278.24 270.35 
Physicians, surgical group of specialties (PP), per 100000 53.55 53.03 34.66 33.23 
Physicians, obstetric & gynaecological group of specialties 
(PP), per 100000 
25.22 24.24 17.44 16.86 
Physicians, paediatric group of specialties (PP), per 100000 47.53 47.74 25.52 26.86 
Dentists (PP) per 100000 39.57 40.76 43.19 43.27 
Pharmacists (PP) per 100000  49.68 60.60 53.78 
Nurses (PP) per 100000 781.03 777.47 617.59 633.47 
Average length of stay, all hospitals 14.90 13.90 8.55 9.56 
Total health expenditure as % of gross domestic product 
(GDP), WHO estimates 
5.00 5.80 6.13 6.80 
Public sector health expenditure as % of total health 
expenditure, WHO estimate 
58.10 66.50 74.06 74.21 
Private sector expenditure on health as % of total health 
expenditure, WHO estimates 
41.90 33.50 25.79 25.94 
Salaries as % of total public health expenditure 36.00 59.90 29.49 34.21 
Private households' out-of-pocket payment on health  
as % of total health expenditure 
30.50 26.30 22.78 24.89 
Source: European health for all database, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe. 
A2. Qualitative analysis — method's choice and technical details 
Method's choice 
Focus groups. Focus groups discussion was chosen as a method of studying the opinions about 
quality and accessibility of health care taking into account the following arguments. Fist, the litera-
ture proves that focus group research is a direct, sensitive, and interactive method of assessing pub-
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lic opinion, accomplishing what pull studies cannot (Luntz, 1994). Second, according to the Ameri-
can Statistical Association, qualitative data received from focus groups is considered as being ex-
tremely valuable when vivid and rich descriptions are needed. The latter is especially important for 
answering such research question as how the health care system operates de facto.  
But our decision about use of the focus groups is based not only on necessity of get rich description 
of health care sector in Ukraine. Following to Luntz (1994) the key to understanding why qualita-
tive research in general and focus groups in particularly are so important today is the following: 
"unlike traditional quantitative research, focus groups are centrally concerned with understanding 
attitudes rather than measuring them". He also stresses that the focus groups' discussion approaches 
attitudes and priorities tangentially by allowing respondents to talk freely and to choose descriptive 
categories significant to them (rather than to researchers). In our research the crucial point is under-
standing of people' attitudes to quality and accessibility of services provided by health care system 
and attitudes towards reforms of the health care system in general and its financing scheme in par-
ticular. 
Besides, the advantage of focus groups is a possibity to gather information about insights of experts 
in a particular sphere (Greenbaum, 1997). Focus groups are a good way to find out perceived norms 
of a certain group. In our research we use focus group of health care specialists in order to obtain 
information about their working incentives, their attitudes to health care system as well as their 
opinions regarding the introducing different co-financing schemes for health care system. 
The results of focus groups in our study serve for the following purposes: 
1. Description of existing health care system de facto (including: (a) working incentives of 
health personnel, attitudes towards the reforming of health care sector and different co-
financing schemes, including attitudes to compulsory and voluntary health insurance; (b) atti-
tude of patients to the existing health care system and approaches for overcoming the draw-
backs of system). 
2. Elaboration of policy recommendations. 
Target audience include providers and consumers of health care (health personnel and patients). 
In-depth interviews. When it is important to explore a subject in detail or probe for latent atti-
tude and feeling, the in-depth interview is an appropriate technique to use (Kumar 1999). In con-
trast to focus groups, in-depth interview gives a chance to follow-up questions and probe for 
meaning. Also people may want to tell something openly only after intensive discussion or in 
face-to-face format (without influence from other people). For this reason we decided to carry out 
in-depth interviews with health personnel and heads of health care establishments to find out their 
opinions and attitudes to different aspects of health care system, including such issues as informal 
payment of patient. 
Taking into account that in-depth interviews can also provide a history of behavior, reveal divergent 
experiences and develop other research tools we use this methods for collecting stories of patients 
about their experience of receiving health care, in particular, informal payments. 
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Therefore, the results of in-depth interviews in our study serve for the following: 
1. Follow-up questions and probe for meaning in order to get depth description of existing health 
care system de facto (including different aspects of health care system, such issues as informal 
payments of patient to doctor, the working incentives of health personnel, attitudes of health 
personnel to the reforming of the health care sector, attitudes to compulsory and voluntary 
medical insurance). 
2. Collecting "live" story of patients about Ukrainian health care system. 
3. Elaboration of policy recommendations. 
Target audience includes providers and consumers of health care (health personnel and patients). 
Standardized interview with open-end questions. Based on in-depth interview findings the stan-
dardized questionnaire with open-end questions has been developed. The main purpose of using this 
research tool was to increase a confidence of the health personnel to our research that should stimu-
late them to answer "inconvenient" questions. First of all, these are questions concerning informal 
payments and scheme of redistribution of informal payments within health care establishment. Also 
the standardized questionnaire allows getting information from health personnel not only from Kyiv 
city but also from other regions. 
Special attention has been paid to developing the standardized questionnaire for policy elite repre-
sentatives. In the project proposal we have planned to conduct the focus groups with policy makers. 
The political crisis resulted by the Government resignation and the number of corruption scandals in 
the middle of September of 2005 as well as beginning of election campaign 2006 had negative im-
pact on the implementation of this project activity, since during the first months of new Prime-
Minister assignment many policy makers were in the uncertainty about their personal future, while 
people deputies and other politicians became busy with the election campaign. In such situation ini-
tiation of any group discussion with policy makers was impossible. But we were able to organize 
face-to-face conversations with members of the Parliament and representatives of executive bodies. 
Therefore, instead of focus groups discussion we conducted interviews with representatives of this 
group. We would like to emphasize that it is the first experience to study "alertness" of top-level 
policy makers on the health care reforms under Ukrainian condition. Based on the conducted inter-
views with policy makers (including members of Ukrainian Parliament) we intend to present their 
point of view on the main problems of financing health care systems, possible ways of health care 
reform.  
Therefore, the results of in-depth interviews in our study serve for the following: 
1. Get more information about "informal payments" issues. 
2. Get opinions of health personnel not only from Kyiv city but also from other regions. 
3. Get information about top-level policy makers' attitudes towards the main problems of financ-
ing health care systems, possible ways of the health care reform.  
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Target audience includes providers of health care (health personnel) and Policy decision-makers 
(member of Parliament, representative of executive bodies). 
Technical details 
Focus groups. Since the health care reform concerns different groups of the population, in our 
study there were we conducted 4 focus groups discussions, approaching several types of audiences 
(see Table 7). Patients were distributed to different focus groups relative to their age.  
Table 7. Main characteristics of the focus groups  
 Target audience Number of participants Ages Gender Specialization Duration 
1 Patients 9 19–22 Mixed  1h 45 min 
2 Patients 11 25–35 Women  1h 56 min 
3 Patients 9 36–55 Mixed  1h 43 min 
4 Health care specialists 
(doctors) 
7 30–55 Mixed Surgery (1) 
Therapeutics (1) 
Thoracic Surgery (1) 
Narcology (1) 
Psychiatry (1) 
Urology (1) 
Otolaryngology (1) 
1h 48 min 
In-depth interviews. The procedure of in-depth interviews was the following: a certified sociolo-
gist interviewed a test person in detail about research topic using a discussion guide. If respondent 
has agreed the interview had been audio-recorded. If not, the interviewer made remarks during 
and after interview. Interview's time varied from 20 to 100 minutes. Numbers of interviews are: 
• 10 in-depth interviews with heads of health care establishments. 
• 10 in-depth interviews with consumers of health care services. 
Standardized interview with open-end question for health personnel. The procedure of filling-
out of standardized questionnaire with open-end questions was the following. By random choice we 
selected a pull of health personnel. The pull consisted of doctors with different specializations, ages 
and genders. They represented the health care establishments of different ownership types (munici-
pal, state and subordinated to various ministries) and different regions. The respondents who were 
in Kyiv City filled out the questionnaire after face-to-face interviews. The respondents from other 
regions of Ukraine only filled out questionnaire. For coordination of this work we used the IER 
network of interviews team leaders in regions.  
Total number of questionnaires is 45. They covered Kyiv City (15), Donentsk (8), Zhytomyr (10), 
Poltava (3), Dnipropetrovsk (5), Cherkassy (4). 
Standardized interview with open-end question for representatives of political elite. The ques-
tionnaire consisted of 7 questions. The respondent answered the questions after getting acquainted 
with the questions Some interviews have been audio-recorded. Interviews took about 15–18 minutes. 
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Total number of interviews is 9. It includes members of Parliament (4) and top-level representatives 
of central and local executive bodies (5). 
A3. Expenditures on health care — international comparison 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Azerbaijan 
Kazakhstan 
Georgia 
Uzbekistan 
Albania 
Turkmenistan 
UKRAINE
Bulgaria 
Turkey 
Russian Federation 
Estonia 
Belarus 
Republic of Moldova 
Slovakia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Poland 
Latvia 
Ireland 
Romania 
Hungary 
Macedonia
Finland 
Czech Republic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Armenia 
Austria 
Norway 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Denmark 
Italy 
Slovenia 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Croatia 
Iceland 
Portugal 
Greece 
France 
Germany 
Switzerland 
TE, % of GDP GE, % of GDP  
Per capita total expenditure on health (TE) and per capita government expenditure on health (GE), at average exchange 
rate (USD), 2001. 
Source: The WHO Statistical Information System, http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html  
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A4. The structure of consolidated health care expenditures according  
to economic classification 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
% % % % % UAH m % 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 15476.47 100.00 
Current expenditures 92.30 92.10 92.50 90.58 86.70 14159.42 91.49 
Expenditures for goods  
and services 91.30 91.10 91.60 89.37 85.21 13929.35 90.00 
Wages of budget employees 37.00 38.30 40.00 38.84 38.65 6821.89 44.08 
Payroll tax 13.80 14.00 14.40 13.72 14.17 2508.04 16.21 
Purchase of goods, materials 
and services 27.00 28.20 27.50 27.47 24.97 3505.36 22.65 
Payment for business trips 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.28 38.63 0.25 
Payment for utility services  
and electricity 11.40 9.50 8.70 8.20 6.83 923.50 5.97 
Heating 5.30 3.90 3.50 3.20 2.47 314.96 2.04 
Water supply 1.70 1.50 1.40 1.35 1.31 184.95 1.20 
Electricity 2.90 2.80 2.60 2.47 2.07 277.25 1.79 
Gas 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.51 0.39 50.34 0.33 
Other communal services and 
electricity 0.70 0.80 0.70 0.66 0.59 96.00 0.62 
R&D 2.00 0.80 0.70 0.78 0.33 131.94 0.85 
Interest payments on liabilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Subsidies and current transfers 1.00 1.10 0.90 1.21 1.48 230.07 1.49 
Subsidies and current transfers 
to enterprises 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.73 102.08 0.66 
Current transfers to population 0.90 0.70 0.70 0.91 0.75 127.55 0.82 
Capital expenditures 6.80 7.90 7.50 9.42 13.30 1317.05 8.51 
Acquisition of fixed assets 6.80 7.70 7.40 9.38 12.84 1169.44 7.56 
Purchase of equipment and  
of durable goods 4.30 4.70 4.60 6.63 9.44 752.76 4.86 
Capital construction 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.06 0.64 91.72 0.59 
Capital repair 2.40 2.90 2.50 2.69 2.76 324.97 2.10 
Purchase of land 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.69 0.01 
Capital transfers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.45 145.82 0.94 
Capital transfers to enterprises 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.45 145.82 0.94 
Capital transfers to population 0.00 0.00 – – – – – 
Crediting 0.00 0.00 0.00 – – – – 
Source: the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine. 
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A5. Coalition agreement — The health care system reform 
The Suggestions to the Coalition Agreement of the Deputies Factions  
in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (May 2006)  
(The coalition agreement was written by the consortium of organizations that comprised of the In-
stitute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, the Razumkov Center, Center of Legal Re-
forms in the framework of project financed by the International Renaissance Foundation, Kyiv of-
fice of Eurasia Foundation and representative office of Fund of Conrad Adenauer in Ukraine. The 
drafted suggestions in the chapter on health care policy are based on the project results.) 
The health care system in Ukraine poorly performs its functions. The population of Ukraine does 
not trust the existing health care system and the health care services are predominantly provided on 
the most expensive in-patient level. The role of the primary level of the health care remains rather 
insignificant. The allocation of the financial resources is performed on the basis of principle of fi-
nancing existing infrastructure but not on the basis of fee for service. There is a lack of incentives 
for improvements of the efficiency of the health care system and introduction of the structural 
changes.  
Priority 1. Provide Ukrainian citizens with the high-quality and accessible health care 
(1) Introduce the list of guaranteed by the state free medical services. 
(2) Emphasize the importance of the primary level health care. 
(3) Encourage the healthy life style and widen the range of prophylactic methods in the health care 
system. 
(4) Eliminate the principle of provision the free health care services by the place of registra-
tion/residence permit. The patients should have a right to freely choose the doctor and later the in-
surance company. 
(5) After the introduction of unified social contribution and its further reduction and introduction 
of reforms in the health care sector, in the medium term to introduce health insurance that would 
allow to provide the aid both by the public and private specialized insurance companies. The 
competition between public and private companies will stipulate for the diversity of the health 
care system as a whole and the insurance policy in particular. The State must provide insurance to 
the poor people. 
Priority 2. The introduction of the efficient financing of the health care system.  
(1) Separate the health care policy development function from the executive function, in particular, 
the budget execution function and managing the health care establishment function. The Ministry of 
Health Care should be responsible for the development of standards and framework agreements for 
the activities in the sector. 
(2) Switch from the principle of financing existing institutions, staff, and services to a fee for ser-
vice basis. 
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(3) Introduce the principle of paying the salaries according to the results of the activity that would 
create incentives for the health personnel work more efficiently. 
(4) Define the property rights in the health care sector, liberalize the market and introduce the 
commercial principles of managing in the health care establishments.  
(5) Remove the barriers for competition between different health care providers. There should exist 
equal rules of the game for the public and private health care establishments. 
(6) Introduce of the contract relations between the customers (State) and providers of health care 
services (health care establishment of any form of property) 
(7) Clearly define the role of private health insurance and its correlation with guaranteed by the 
state health care. 
Priority 3. Protection of patients' rights 
(1) Define the mechanism of protection the patients' rights on the legislative level. In particular, pa-
tients should have the right to obtain the information on the methods of their treatment.    
A6. Necessary legislation  
The reforms are based on the legislation approved in the country. In order to improve performance 
of health care in Ukraine, the policy makers should develop and approve regulation that would: 
• Amend the Constitutional provision of providing all health care free of charge. The Constitution 
should guarantee the universal coverage of all population by the basic list of quality health care, 
which is to be approved by the Government and the Parliament. 
• Amend the provision of the Constitution on the impossibility to reduce number of state and mu-
nicipal health establishments. This would allow for better restructuring in the sector, introduc-
tion of commercialization measures, and later privatization of some health establishments. 
• Change the legal status of public health care providers to the economic entities, which would 
allow them to operate with funds received. 
• Approve standards of service provision, which would allow for effective control and monitoring 
of the HCP work. 
• Approve the methodology of estimation prices of health care as well as standards for expendi-
ture control. 
• Switch financing towards fee-for-service basis. The respective regulation should define ser-
vices, standards of their provision and determine the price regulation. 
• Liquidate the principle of providing health care free of charge only in the residential health care 
establishments. This would promote the competition between HCP as well as improve access of 
population to quality health care. 
• Stipulate procedures of contracting between local authorities and health care providers.  
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• Create conditions under which the management of the health care establishment could be a 
separate private entity, which works under the specific control. 
• In the longer run, foresee the regulation of the privatization of health care establishments in 
Ukraine.  
• In the longer run, approve a law on introduction of compulsory health insurance, which will be 
provided by public as well as private health insurance companies. The flat insurance contribu-
tion should be foreseen. The insurance for low-income people should be covered by the local 
authorities at the expense of special subvention from the central government.  
The list of changes is not complete. However, this will be a start of creating necessary legislative 
framework of health reforms in Ukraine. 
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